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RECENT ILLINOIS DECISIONS
AUTOMOBILES-INJURIES FROM OPERATION, OR USE OF HIGHWAY-
WHETHER STATUTORY PROVISION FOR SUBSTITUTED SERVICE ON RESIDENT
MOTORIST WHO LATER BECOMES A NON-RESIDENT IS VALID AND POSSESSES
RETROACTIVE EFEcT--Plaintiffs, in the case of Ogdon v. Gianakos,' were
the administrators of the estate of a decedent who had been killed in an
automobile accident occurring in Illinois. The defendant, at the time of
the accident, was a resident of the state but, subsequent thereto, became
a non-resident. Following the accident, the legislature of the state amended
the applicable statute to provide for substituted service of process upon
resident motorists who should become non-residents prior to service of
summons. 2 The action was instituted after the passage of this amendment
and service of process was had in accordance therewith. Defendant did not
appear personally, was represented by an attorney appointed by the court,
had verdict against him, but secured a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict in his favor on motion made for that purpose. The Appellate
Court for the Third District reversed this judgment, but it did order
the trial court to quash the return on the ground that the statute, as
amended, did not possess retroactive effect. On leave to appeal, 3 the
Illinois Supreme Court reversed this holding4 when it concluded that the
statute, as amended, was both valid and retroactive in character.
Basing its conclusion on the idea that statutory amendments of the
kind in question constitute a valid exercise of the police power and that
the consent of the defendant, whether express or implied, is no longer
necessary to bring a defendant within the jurisdiction of a trial court,
the Illinois Supreme Court appears to have announced a change in the
concept supporting service statutes.5 The erstwhile agency theory, once
made the controlling element to save these statutes from constitutional
attack, has now been made a yield to a power theory stemming from the
mere fact that a plaintiff has suffered an injury arising from the defend-
1415 I1. 591, 114 N. E. (2d) 686 (1953), reversing 348 Ill. App. 576, 109 N. E.
(2d) 628 (1952).
2 Ill. Laws 1949, p. 1134: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2. Ch. 95 , § 23.
3 Granted pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 199.
4 The cause was remanded to the trial court for the purpose of procuring a ruling
on defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
5 A similar expression by the United States Supreme Court appears in the opinion
in Olberding v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., - U. S. -, 74 S. Ct. 83, 98 L. Ed.
(adv.) 7 (1953), reversing 201 F. (2d) 582 (1953), where it was said that the
fictitious consent under statutes providing for substituted service would not operate
to waive federal venue provisions.
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ant's use of the state highway.6 The court appears to have stood on
firmer ground when it declared the provision for substituted service
applicable to the defendant, even though passed after the cause of action
had arisen, for statutes of this type are procedural in character and the
law is clear that no one has a vested right in any particular procedural
provision if it is constitutional in all other respects. To say the least,
the construction given to the amendment in question effectively blocks
another avenue of escape from liability previously open to those who may
have used the highways of Illinois to the detriment of its citizens. 7
DIVORCE--ALIMONY, ALLOWANCES AND DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY-
WHETIIER A FOREIGN ANNULMENT OF SECOND MARRIAGE POR IMPOTENCY
OPERATEs To REVIvE AN EARLma OBLIGATION TO PAY ALIMONY-According
to the facts of the recent case of Linneman v. Linneman,' plaintiff had
secured an Illinois divorce from the defendant who was at that time,
among other things, ordered to pay plaintiff periodic alimony until her
death or remarriage. Plaintiff subsequently remarried in Illinois and
thereafter took up residence in California. Following this remarriage,
defendant ceased to pay alimony. About one year later, plaintiff procured
a California decree of annulment of the second marriage, based on the
impotency of her spouse, and then demanded that defendant resume the
payment of alimony to her. Upon his refusal to do so, plaintiff petitioned
the Illinois court to hold defendant for his contemptuous disregard of
the Illinois decree. This petition was dismissed by the trial court, and
the dismissal was affirmed by the Appellate Court for the First District
on plaintiff's appeal to it, on the ground the Illinois court was not obliged
to give credit to the California decree annulling the second marriage inas-
much as the plaintiff, had she sued in Illinois, would have been entitled to no
more than a divorce for the cause alleged. As the alimony obligation
had been terminated by the second marriage,2 the subsequent annulment
thereof was deemed insufficient to revive the obligation.
The plaintiff had relied on the recent case of Sutton v. Leib as au-
thority for the contention that the Illinois court was obliged to give full
6 As to what constitutes use of the highway, see Brauer Machine & Supply Co.
v. Parkhill Truck Co., 383 Ii1. 569, 50 N. E. (2d) 836 (1943).
7 See the recent case of Dart Transit Co. v. Wiggins, 1 Ill. App. (2d) 126, 117
N. 11. (2d) 314 (1954), where it was held that the cause of action need not be one
sounding in tort. The case also holds that the injured plaintiff, as well as the
defendant, may be a non-resident and still have the benefit of the state statute
when suing in the jurisdiction where the cause of action arose.
I Ill. App. (2d) 48, 116 N. E. (2d) 182 (1953).
2 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 19.
8 199 F. (2d) 163 (1952). For earlier aspects of the case, see 342 U. S. 402, 72 S.
Ct. 398, 96 L. Ed. 448 (1952), noted in 30 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REviEW 266.
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faith and credit to the California annulment. In that case, a Nevada
marriage had been annulled by a New York court on the ground that
bigamy was involved. The plaintiff there, as in the principal case, there-
after sought to revive an obligation to pay alimony previously decreed by
an Illinois court in a divorce action and the United States Supreme Court
held that the Illinois court had to give recognition to the New York
annulment, resulting in the revival of the obligation to pay alimony.
The cited case was, however, held to be inapplicable in that, while bigamy
is a common ground for annulment, impotency is such only in certain
states and is not so in Illinois.4
The narrow interpretation so given to the holding in the Sutton case
raised an issue as to whether the law of California or of Illinois should
govern with respect to the annulment of the second marriage. The court
reasoned, both from Illinois and California authority, that any question
as to the validity of the second marriage should be governed by the law
of the state where the marriage was celebrated, 5 hence it treated the
California action attacking the validity of the Illinois second marriage
as being governed by Illinois substantive law. Concluding that annulment
was more relief than would be granted in Illinois for impotency, the
court achieved the result that it was not bound by the California decree.
It appears to have overlooked the thought that the same argument would
appear to be true of the Sutton-Leib situation for, while annulments
have been granted in Illinois where bigamy has been found present,6 the
legislature has also specified the presence of a prior marriage undissolved
as a ground for absolute divorce. 7 If Illinois tests are to be applied in
such cases, there is reason to believe that logical distinctions should be
drawn between invalid and valid second marriages,8 with necessary revi-
4 While impotency is generally considered to be a matter bearing upon capacity
to contract a valid marriage, hence an equitable ground for recission, the court
appears to treat the action of the Illinois legislature in specifying impotency as a
ground for absolute divorce, as described in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 1,
as equivalent to a declaration that such marriages are valid in inception. While
they are nowhere considered to be absolutely void, they should be treated as being
voidable, at least, because of the fraud perpetrated on the innocent spouse.
5 See Reifschneider v. Reifschneider, 241 I1l. 92, 89 N. E. 255 (1909), and Cal.
Civ. Code, § 63.
6 Hunt v. Hunt, 252 Ill. App. 490 (1929).
7 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 1, states: "In every case in which a marriage
has been . . . contracted and solemnized ... and it shall be adjudged . . . that either
party . . . had a wife or husband living at the time . . . it shall be lawful for the
injured party to obtain a divorce and dissolution of such marriage contract."
8 In Gaines v. Jacobsen, - App. Div. -, 127 N. Y. S. (2d) 909 (1954), another
Sutton-Leib situation, the court drew the only logical conclusion it could with
respect to the efficacy of a second marriage based on a Nevada divorce, but neverthe-
less came up with the result that the annulment thereof did not revive an obligation
to provide for support which rested on private agreement rather than on a judicial
decree. Dore, P. J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
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sion being made in the statute on the basis of that distinction. At present,
it confuses those cases in which divorce would be proper with those wherein
annulment, rather than divorce, would be more appropriate.
INSURANCE-ATIONS ON POLICIES-WHETHER PROVISION IN AUTO-
MOBILE POLICY LIMITING INSURER'S LIABILITY TO CASES IN WHICH CLAIMS
HAVE BEEN FINALLY DETERMINED PREVENTS RECOVERY BY INSURED FOR
SUMS PAID UNDER A VOLUNTARY SETTLEMENT-In the recent case of
Piper v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company,' the insured
sought reimbursement from the insurer for sums paid out under a settle-
ment, voluntarily effected, with persons who had been injured in a collision
with the insured automobile. The insurer denied liability under the
policy 2 but particularly relied on a policy provision to the effect that no
action should lie against the company unless, as a condition precedent
thereto, the amount of the insured's obligation to pay should have been
finally determined, either by judgment against the insured after an actual
trial or by written agreement of the insured, the claimant, and the com-
pany. A trial court judgment for the insured was reversed upon appeal
when the Appellate Court for the Fourth District, without the benefit
of any earlier Illinois precedent, held the provision in question to be
unequivocal, valid, and enforcible, hence served as a bar to the present
action.
While such a policy provision as the one here involved has never
before been passed upon by a court of review in Illinois, the Appellate
Court was not dealing with an entirely novel legal situation for other
courts, in a variety of jurisdictions, have previously considered provisions
of this character.3 It is true that there was some variation in the type
of insurance policies concerned and in the phraseology of the particular
provisions involved but, in each of these earlier cases, the purpose of
the provision was clearly one designed to limit the insurer's liability to
situations in which claims against the insured had been finally determined.
The courts there concerned acted unanimously to sustain such provisions,
declaring them to be not only valid and enforceable but also essential
1 1I1. App. (2d) 1, 116 N. E. (2d) 86 (1953).
2 For an additional defense, the company alleged that the policy was not in force,
having been cancelled two days prior to the collision for nonpayment of premiums.
The insured appeared to have reinstated the policy two days after the accident but
without giving notice to the company of the fact of an accident. This defense was
not discussed as the court based its decision on the provision contained in the policy.
3 See, for example, Thacher v. Aetna Accident & Liability Co., 287 F. 484, 28
A. L. R. 1280 (1923) ; Royal Indemnity Co. v. Jenkins Construction Co., 248 Ky. 839,
60 S. W. (2d) 105 (1933) ; Marvel Heat Corporation v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 325
Mass. 682, 92 N. E. (2d) 233 (1950) : Kennelly v. London Guarantee & Accident Co.,
184 App. Dlv. 1, 171 N. Y. S. 423 (1918) ; Wisconsin Zinc Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit
Co., 162 Wis. 39, 155 N. W. 1081 (1916).
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to the financial stability of insurance companies. As such companies do
not undertake to recognize liability, or to pay, simply because claims are
presented, and must refuse so to do in order to protect themselves against
being forced to pay excessive damages, the decision in the instant case
should not prove to be a surprising one.
PARTITION-ACTIONS FOR PARTITION-WHETHER A NINETY-NINE YEAR
LEASEHOLD IS SUBJECT TO PARTITION IN ILLINoIs-The Appellate Court for
the First District, in the case of Pierce v. Pierce,1 was presented with the
necessity of deciding whether an interest in a ninety-nine year leasehold
would be of sufficient legal stature as to be contained within the meaning
of the phrase "lands, tenements, or hereditaments," used in the Illinois
Partition Act to describe interests which might be partitioned by judicial
proceedings. 2 The plaintiff, owner as tenant in common of a fractional
interest in the leasehold in question, instituted proceedings for partition
and named the remaining tenants in common as defendants. Upon motion
of these defendants, the lower court dismissed the complaint for want of
equity on the ground that the quoted phrase referred to freehold interests
whereas a lease, regardless of the length of the term, was personalty,
hence not subject to partition under the statute. On appeal, the Ap-
pellate Court reversed and remanded this holding, electing not to follow
historic definitions but instead to recognize that long-term leases had be-
come a sufficiently common method of land holding as to be afforded the
stature of real estate for this purpose.
The court, in the absence of any Illinois precedent squarely on the
point, based its decision on what it determined the legislative intent to
have been. In so doing, it recognized the fact that the strict, technical,
feudal definition of the term "real estate," as defined by Coke3 and Black-
stone,4 has not been followed for all purposes in Illinois, both by statute
and by decision. In support of this fact, the court pointed to the statute
dealing with conveyances wherein chattels real 5 are included within the
definition of "real estate,"6 as well as to the Judgments and Decrees Act
which defines real estate as including leasehold estates.7 Faced with the
1 351 Ill. App. 336, 115 N. E. (2d) 107 (1953). Leate to appeal has been granted.
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 106, § 44.
3 1 Co. Litt., 219.
4 2 Bi. Com., 386.
5 The case of Shedd v. Patterson, 312 I1. 371, 144 N. E. 5 (1924), declares that a
leasehold estate for a long term of years is a chattel real to be classed as real estate.
But see Orchard v. Wright-Dalton-Bell-Anchor Store Co., 225 Mo. 414. 125 S. W. 486
(1909).
o Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 30, § 37.
7 Ibid., Ch. 77, § 3.
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obvious argument that, if the legislature had intended to include lease-
holds as being within the purview of the statute in question, it would have
done so expressly, as it had done in other instances, the court stated that
if the fact had been called to the attention of the legislature, as it had
been at other times, the legislature would, in all probability, have expressly
provided for this inclusion.
Here is probably the weakest point in the decision, but it is by no
means fatal to the argument in view of the modern trend away from
narrow historic terminology. As an example of state policy in this re-
gard, the court cited the case of Mellvaine v. Foreman," one in which the
trustees over a ninety-nine year leasehold had filed a suit asking partition
of their interests. Although the case was decided against the petitioners
on another point,9 the fact that they had a sufficient interest to sustain
their action was, by strong implication, taken for granted. 10 Despite a
remarkable absence of precedent supporting the right of a tenant for
years to bring an action for partition against his co-tenant, some encyclo-
pedias and at least one court have spoken of this idea as being more than
a mere possibility."
It should be noted, however, that the court was careful to point to the
fact that the present action was one in chancery and that it would be
inequitable to hold otherwise than as it did. If it should be faced with a
situation in which there was no statutory basis for any enlargement upon
archaic distinctions in the definition of real property, it is likely the court
would feel constrained to follow such older definitions, any feeling of
equity to the contrary, so the instant case should be deemed to be one of
limited scope.
PLEADING-SIGNATURE AND VERIFICATION-WHEITHER OR NoT PERJURY
MAY BE ASSIGNED ON A VERIFIED ANSWER ALTHOUGH THE SAME WAS NOT
REQUIRED TO BE VER1---In the recent case of Loraitis v. Kukulka,'
a proceeding instituted on an unsworn complaint to set aside a fraudulent
conveyance, the defendant filed a denial answer which, although not re-
8 292 Ill. 224, 126 N. E. 749 (1920).
9 The lease was held void as being In violation of a statute interpreted by the
court to forbid the formation of a corporation for the purpose of acquiring real
estate for investment.
10 See also Imperial Building Co. v. Chicago Open Board of Trade, 238 Ill. 100,
87 N. E. 167 (1908), where the court recognized that a ninety-nine year leasehold
was to be considered real estate for some purposes and, by implication, might be
subject to partition.
11 Field v. Lelter, 16 Wyo. 1 at 37, 90 P. 378 at 386 (1907). See also 68 C. J. S.,
Partition, § 27; 40 Am. Jur., Partition, § 109.
11 Ill. (2d) 533, 116 N. E. (2d) 329 (1953).
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quired to be verified,2 was in fact verified by the defendant. Thereafter,
plaintiff petitioned for the taking of a deposition from the defendant who
first unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the petition and then refused to
answer the questions propounded on the ground that, if he answered such
questions, he might subject himself to a possible prosecution for perjury.
For this refusal, he was adjudged guilty of contempt and ordered con-
fined in jail until he did answer. On direct appeal by defendant to the
Supreme Court of Illinois,s that court affirmed the order when it held the
defendant was not justified in refusing to answer because (1) he had ef-
fectively taken an oath although not obliged to do so, and (2) had vol-
untarily given up all privilege to remain silent by his act in filing the
answer in question.
No question can be made over the fact that a person who wilfully
swears to a civil pleading, knowing it to contain false statements with
regard to material aspects of the case, thereby exposes himself to a prose-
cution for perjury,4 as well as other possible consequences, 5 provided the
pleading be one which, by law, the party was bound to verify under oath.0
The exact point here concerned, however, one dealing with the effect to be
given to a verified answer when verification was not positively required by
law, goes beyond the fundamental premise mentioned and treats with the
consequence to be attached when the pleading is one which may, rather
than must, be verified. It has elsewhere been held that, in cases dealing
with the verification of initial pleadings, the fact that a party is free to
swear thereto or not is not material to the issue of perjury if, in fact,
a false oath is taken for the pleading is then likely to possess an added
effect not true of unsworn pleadings.7  Despite this, there are cases
achieving a contrary result where the false oath has been taken in con-
nection with a subsequent pleading, such as in relation to an answer,
provided it could be said that the verification so given added nothing to the
quality of the pleading or the record.8 The instant case, unique in Illinois,
accepts the first of these two ideas as the basis for the indicated result.
That result would seem to be a justifiable one inasmuch as, in this state,
2 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 159(1).
s Direct appeal was deemed to be proper inasmuch as the defendant claimed the
order violated constitutional rights guaranteed to him by the Fourth, Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and by Ill. Const. 1870,
Art. II, §§ 2 and 6.
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, VoL 1, Ch. 38, § 473.
5 Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 165.
6 Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 159, specifies the instances wherein sworn pleadings in
civil matters are required.
7 See People v. Godines, 17 Cal. App. (2d) 721, 62 P. (2d) 787 (1936), and
Lappley v. State, 170 Wis. 356, 174 N. W. 913, 7 A. L. R. 1279 (1919).
8 The cases so holding are collected In the opinion in People v. Millsap, 85 Cal.
App. 732, 260 P. 378 (1927).
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the introduction of a sworn pleading at any point in the chain, whether
verified under compulsion or not, possesses the effect of forcing the op-
ponent to verify any responsive pleading.
RELEASE--PLEADING, EVIDENCE, TRIAL, AND REVIEW-WHETHER JURY,
UNDFE DuTy o Fix DAMAGES IN A TORT ACTION, is E rTILED To LEARN
Or AMouN'r PAID FOR COVENANT NOT TO SuFn-The method to be pursued in
fixing the measure of damage in a personal injury action resting on the
Illinois Dram Shop Act' became the subject of consideration in the case of
De Lude v. Rimek.2 Plaintiff had been injured in an automobile collision
between his car and one driven by another who had, allegedly, become in-
toxicated on liquor sold him by the defendants. A settlement of the com-
mon low action had been made in the form of a covenant not to sue, which
fact was pleaded by defendants in their answer. Thereafter, over objec-
tion, the existence of this covenant was established in the presence of the
jury at the trial of the case. A verdict of not guilty followed and judg-
ment in the trial court ran against the plaintiff. On his appeal, the
Appellate Court for the First District held it was prejudicial error to
permit the jury to learn of the covenant and a new trial was granted.
The court acknowledged the right of the defendants to have the amount
paid for the covenant not to sue deducted from the damages awarded to
the plaintiff but said that it was the duty of the trial judge to make this
adjustment as a jury would be likely to be prejudiced if it was per-
mitted to learn of a substantial recovery from another person for the same
injury.
The right of a defendant to have damage reduced correspondingly
when a co-tortfeasor has paid plaintiff for a covenant not to sue for injury
arising from the same circumstance may be said to have been settled by
the case of Aldridge v. Morris.3 In that case, however, the dictum was
expressed that it would be proper to submit to the jury not only the evi-
dence relating to such a payment but also an instruction informing the
jury as to its right to consider such a payment in arriving at the verdict.
Since the holding therein, the principle of reduction has been acknowledged
in several other cases but the actual method utilized in making the adjust-
ment has varied. In Curtis v. City of Chicago,4 for example, on reversal
of the judgment for trial court refusal to reduce damages accordingly, the
trial judge was directed to reduce the judgment by an amount equal to
that paid for the covenant not to sue. In the next case, that of New York,
1 11. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 43, § 135.
2351 Il. App. 466, 115 N. E. (2d) 561 (1953).
3337 Ill. App. 369, 86 N. E. (2d) 143 (1949), noted in 27 CMCAGO-KENT LAW
Rnvrzw 313. Leave to appeal therein was denied.
4 339 Ill. App. 61, 89 N. E. (2d) 63 (1949).
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Chicago & St. Louis Railroad Company v. American Transit Lines, Inc.,5
a reduction in the amount of damages was permitted upon a petition after
verdict. The views expressed therein were rejected in the still later case
of Hyde v. Montgomery Ward & Company, Inc.," decided by the Appellate
Court for the Third District, which returned to the idea that it would be
error not to permit the jury to hear of the existence of the covenant and
to allow them to mitigate the damage accordingly. 7 The author of a dis-
senting opinion in the last mentioned case spoke for the same court when
it decided the appeal in Smith v. Medendorp.s The plaintiff there, in the
complaint, admitted that the defendant was entitled to have the sum paid
for a covenant not to sue considered by the jury in arriving at the verdict.
No issue was made on the point at the trial but, after verdict, a motion to
reduce the verdict by the sum paid for the covenant was made and over-
ruled and, on appeal, this action was affirmed on the ground the failure to
make an issue with respect to the payment was fatal to the motion.9
The instant decision, in the main, follows these earlier cases in recog-
nizing the right of defendant to have the damages adjusted to correspond
with the amount paid for the covenant not to sue. It departs from them, how-
ever, in that it considers the fact that a jury could be prejudiced either
for or against a plaintiff who has already recovered something for or on
account of the very injuries of which he complains. To avoid that
prejudice, it makes the trial judge the mathematician provided no issue of
fact arises concerning the presence of the covenant itself or as to the
amount paid therefor. If such an issue were to arise the jury would likely
have to be informed, but then the possibility of prejudice could not be
avoided. That possibility could be minimized if future covenants were to
be taken in individual rather than joint form and if each covenant were
drafted so as to specify the actual amount paid. In that way, provided
the defendant raises the point by answer and moves for allowance of credit
prior to judgment, justice could be done to all concerned.
5339 IlI. App. 282, 89 N. E. (2d) 858 (1949), noted in 29 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
RvIw 361. The cause was reversed, for other reasons in 408 Ill. 336, 97 N. E. (2d)
264 (1951).
6343 Ill. App. 388, 99 N. E. (2d) 382 (1951). The defendant there had pleaded
the existence of the covenant in the answer but this allegation had been stricken on
motion. A petition after judgment, seeking comparable relief, was also denied by
the trial court.
7 An important fact issue was also presented in that case. The covenant there
concerned had been executed by both the plaintiff and his wife in return for a single
stated consideration paid to them. The jury would be obliged first to ascertain the
portion of the consideration attributable to the plaintiff's cause before a deduction
could be made.
8 343 111. App. 512, 99 N. E. (2d) 571 (1951).
9The case of Burns v. Stouffer, 344 Ill. App. 105, 100 N. E. (2d) 507 (1951),
would appear to suggest that, if the covenant is given to one defendant during the
trial, the other defendant should seek permission to file a supplemental answer in
order to lay the foundation for proof with respect thereto.
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THEATERS AND SHOWS--LIABILITIES FOR INJURIES TO PERSONS ATTEND-
ING-WnH ER OR NOT COMBINATION OF UNLIGHTED AISLE AND PRESENCE
op DEBRIS THEREIN RENDERS THEATER OWNER LIABLE POP. INJURY SUS-
TAINED BY PATRON-The slovenly habits of certain modern movie theater
patrons would appear to have been the cause of the novel tort question
presented in the recent case of Davis v. Theatre Amusement Company.1
The plaintiff there concerned had, as a patron, entered a theater owned
by the defendant and, after watching the movie for about an hour, de-
veloped a headache and decided to leave. As he was proceeding up the
unlit center aisle toward the door, he slipped on an unknown object on the
aisle floor and fell forward, striking his chin on the floor and suffering
a permanent injury. He based his action on the theory that the defendant
was negligent in failing to have a light on in the aisle and in permitting
the accumulation of debris therein. Despite defendant's contention that
a moving picture house must, of necessity, operate in partial darkness, so
the lack of bright illumination could not be said to constitute negligence,
the trial court granted judgment on a verdict in plaintiff's favor. That
judgment was affirmed, on defendant's appeal, by the Appellate Court
for the First District when it concluded that the patron was entitled to
have enough light to be able to observe the condition of the aisle floor as
he moved about inside the premises.
It does not appear that the precise factual situation presented in the
instant case has been passed upon before in Illinois, but the legal issue is
similar to the one presented in the case of Gibbons v. Balaban & Katz
Corporation.2 It was there held that it was the duty of the owner of the
theater to exercise reasonable care to light the aisles and stairways so that
a patron might safely enter or leave the theater while the performance
was in progress. This view was enlarged upon in the later case of Crowley
v. Bugg.3 The court there stated that, even though it was the presence of
a child in the aisle of a darkened theater which caused the plaintiff to fall,
that fact did not excuse the defendant from the duty imposed upon him
by law to keep and maintain the aisles of the theater in a reasonably safe
condition. Distinguishing the present case from those cited on defendant's
behalf 4 by pointing out that, in the instant case, the jury was entitled to
find from the evidence that the cluttered aisle in question was in total
darkness, whereas it had been shown in the other cases that a degree of
1351 Ill. App. 517, 115 N. E. (2d) 915 (1953). Leave to appeal has been denied.
2 242 Ill. App. 524 (1926).
3 292 Ill. App. 210, 10 N. E. (2d) 678 (1937).
4 See Rosston v. Sullivan, 278 Mass. 31, 179 N. E. 173 (1932); Falk v. Stanley
Fabian Corp., 115 N. J. L. 141, 178 A. 740 (1935); Beck v. Stanley Company of
America, 355 Pa. 608, 50 A. (2d) 306 (1947).
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illumination of the type common to motion picture theaters was present,
the court proceeded to reach a logical extension in the holdings in the
earlier Illinois cases. It is now apparent that, if theater owners will
operate concession booths with a consequent increase in the possibility of
an accumulation of debris, they must expect to suffer an enlargement in
their legal responsibilities as the price for enlargement in their business
opportunities.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER -RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF PARTIES -
WHErHER OR NOT A BONA FIDE PURCHASER FROM BENEFICIARIES UNDER A
PROBATED WILL IS TO BE PROTECTED AGAINST CLAIMS OF A SUBSEQUENTLY
DISCOVERED WIDOW OF THE TESTATOR-Recently, in Petta v. Host,1 the
Illinois Supreme Court was confronted with a battle of equities between a
bona fide purchaser from the beneficiaries named in a probated will and
a subsequently discovered heir. The novel circumstances arose because
the plaintiff had been deserted in her home state by her husband who
thereafter moved to Illinois, remarried without obtaining a divorce, and
then died seized of Illinois land. Proceedings were had to probate the
husband's will and estate, but no mention was made therein of plaintiff's
existence. After the estate had been closed, the land in question was sold
and eventually came into the hands of the defendant. Plaintiff, then
learning of her husband's death, promptly took action to amend the pro-
bate record, to renounce the terms of the will, and to claim an interest in
the realty by means of a suit for partition. 2 The trial court rendered
judgment adverse to the plaintiff and, upon direct appeal,3 the Supreme
Court affirmed. While the court stated that the plaintiff had an equal
equity with the defendant, hence was equally entitled to protection, it
based the decision on the public interest involved in protecting the mer-
chantability of titles passing through probate proceedings, particularly
applicable in cases where the public record failed to give notice of a valid
outstanding claim against the property.
While the exact factual situation appears not to have arisen previously
in Illinois, the court followed an analogous line of prior decisions, rendered
in this state and elsewhere. It has been established, in a majority of other
jurisdictions where this problem has been encountered, that the title of a
11 II1. (2d) 293, 115 N. E. (2d) 881 (1953).
2The case also involved a dispute over a parcel acquired by the husband but sold
by him some three years prior to his death. It was held, with respect thereto, that
the right of the widow to claim common law dower had lapsed for failure to take
affirmative action to claim the same within the time fixed by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953,
Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 171.
3 Direct appeal, because a freehold was involved, was based on Ill. Rev. Stat.
1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 199.
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purchaser who buys in good faith for a valuable consideration is not to be
affected by a subsequent revocation or amendment of the probate record
for he is said to occupy the position of a bona fide purchaser for value and
is to be protected as such. 4 Much the same rule was applied in Illinois not
long ago to protect a bona fide purchaser from the effect of a subsequently
discovered will which operated to divest the vendors of their supposed
title.5 Although the instant case does not deal with a situation wherein the
probate of a will has been revoked, or one in which a subsequently discov-
ered will is produced for probate, the law announced therein is but a logical
extension of the doctrine designed to protect bona fide purchasers who
have relied on a public record which, being fair on its face, gives no notice
of a possible equity or title in favor of a third person.
WILLS-CONSTRUCTION-WHETHER A No-CONTEST CLAUSE IN A WILL
SUPPoR s FORFEITURE OF A LEGACY GrVEN TO A BENEFICIARY WHO FAILS TO
DEFEND A' CONTEST OF THAT WiL--A significant decision regarding the
interpretation to be given to a no-contest provision in a will was recently
rendered in the case of Brunt v. Osterlund.1 The case was one in which
certain legatees, named in a bequest which contained a forfeiture provision
for contest of the will, had allowed a default judgment to be entered
against them in an otherwise unsuccessful will contest suit. The executrix,
on final report, contended that the legatees had forfeited their bequest
because of this default. The legatees, under an answer denying that a
right of forfeiture existed, convinced the probate court that they were
entitled to the legacy and also prevailed on a trial de novo in the circuit
court.2  On further appeal by the executrix, the Appellate Court for the
Second District also affirmed the decision, holding that a mere failure to
answer or defend a will contest suit does not produce a forfeiture of a
legacy inasmuch as customary provisions for forfeiture, sometimes found
in wills, usually require the taking of affirmative action against the will
before becoming operative.
Inasmuch as, prior to the instant decision, no Illinois reviewing court
appears to have had occasion to consider the precise problem here involved,
the court first turned for solution of the problem to the language used
by the testator. In that connection, it has been said that the issue as to
whether or not the conduct of a beneficiary amounts to a breach of the
no-contest clause must depend on the particular language used by the
4 See annotation In 26 A. L. R. 270.
5 Eckland v. Jankowski, 407 I1. 263, 95 N. E. (2d) 342 (1950), noted in 29
CHICAGo-KENT LAw REVIEw 265 (1951).
1 351 Ill. App. 556, 115 N. E. (2d) 909 (1953).
2 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, §§ 484 and 487.
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testator.3 As the provision is usually one calling for forfeiture in case of
a "contest" of the will, which ordinarily operates as a condition subse-
quent,4 the court turned to the cases of Clark v. Bentley5 and Lobb v.
Brown6 for assistance in finding the meaning intended by the testator.
In the first of these cases, the will provided for forfeiture in case of a con-
test, alteration, or change in the provisions of the will. It was held that
the making of deeds by the devisees, conveying their interests in the real
estate devised in a fashion different than the testator's plan of distribu-
tion, would not work a forfeiture inasmuch as the testator contemplated
some form of judicial, as contrasted with private, action.
The second case, more nearly in point, held that a failure to deny a
charge of undue influence, made in a will contest suit, was insufficient to
show that the legatees were aiding in the contest, hence would not work
a forfeiture. It would seem to follow, then, that a mere failure to defend
or the submission to an order of default should not be treated as a "con-
test" of the will for these are forms of negative rather than affirmative
conduct. In that light, the holding in the instant case must be regarded
as a correct and logical one.
3 Cassem v. Kennedy, 147 Ill. 660, 35 N. E. 738 (1893).
4 Nevitt v. Woodburn, 190 I1. 283, 60 N. E. 500 (1901).
5 398 Il. 535, 76 N. E. (2d) 438 (1948).
6 208 Cal. 476, 281 P. 1010 (1929).
